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With the decline in social capital and the rise of the immigrant populace in the United States, 
there is renewed interest in civic education as a way to provide a meaningful understanding of 
citizenship and thereby greater civic integration into American political life.1 Although public 
education is often seen as a repository and conveyance of civic education, it is also transmitted 
through institutions in civil society, such as the family, religious organizations, and the mass 
media.2 However, scholars focus on public schools because studies have demonstrated that they 
are the most effective institutions in delivering civic education.3 Furthermore, most states have 
an explicit mission to prepare students for citizenship by requiring some sort of civic education 
in their schools. It is only in schools where a deliberate type of instruction about civics takes 
place, resulting in a substantial increase in students’ understanding of their roles and 
responsibilities as citizens.4 
Given the importance of public schools in civic education, it would appear that Spartan and 
Socratic models of education would be preferred. In both regimes, the political community 
removes the institutions of civil society, like the family, from the civic education of children so 
there are no obstacles to the state teaching them. Substituting itself for their families, the political 
community provides a civic education that is common to all children, as opposed to the Athenian 
version where education is practiced privately, yielding disparate lessons about citizenship. By 
contrast, the Spartan and Socratic regimes offer an education where all children know their civic 
roles and responsibilities because there is no discordant voice. At first it would appear that the 
Spartan and Socratic regimes would serve as a model for the United States to revitalize civic 
education for its citizens. 
But these regimes actually undermine the very conditions that would make a meaningful civic 
education possible. As Aristotle points out, by not respecting the plurality of institutions and the 
diversity of goods that exist in the political community, both the Spartan and Socratic regimes 
are not able to cultivate virtues like piety, civic friendship, and generosity, which are required for 
the common good to exist and be sustained. Although the aims of the household, as an institution 
of civil society, are ultimately subordinate to the aims of the political community, it must be 
allowed to flourish so as not to eliminate the conditions that make a genuine civic education 
possible. Instead of being its greatest advantage, the elimination of civil society is the greatest 
weakness in Spartan and Socratic civic education. The result is not virtuous citizens but a bestial 
and divisive people. 
This examination of the household, and more broadly of civil society, as the required 
conditions for civic education is neglected by Aristotelian scholars; rather they focus on the 
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relationship between the common good of civic education and the happiness of individual 
flourishing (eudaimonia).5 What I contend is that the plurality of institutions and the diversity of 
goods that exist within the political community are the conditions that enable citizens to 
recognize the common good, and thereby become more fully integrated into the regime. Civic 
education is having citizens learn to balance among their personal interest, the regime’s peculiar 
ends, and virtue itself within their own souls and in their judgments about the common good. 
Contrary to its Spartan and Socratic counterparts, the Aristotelian political community requires 
plurality and diversity for these excellences to exist. 
This is one of a series of paradoxes for Aristotle in his account of the conditions needed for 
civic education: philosophical truth and public piety requires the family; civic friendship and 
generosity depends upon private property; the political justice of the community presupposes the 
natural justice of the household; and devotion to the common good arises from private 
friendship. It is the preservation of the plurality of institutions and diversity of goods that enable 
citizens to become part of the commonality of the regime. It is these paradoxes that make 




According to Aristotle, one of the great fallacies of understanding politics is that “there is no 
difference between a large household and a polis” (Politics 1252a12–13).6 This fallacy explains 
Aristotle’s criticism of “those who think the same person a fit statesman, and a king, and a 
household head, and a slave-master” (Politics, 1252a7–9; 1260b22–1261a22). Although the 
political community is the most architectonic of human associations, political authority is not to 
supplant domestic authority—whether the father, husband, or master—in the ruling of its proper 
subjects—the child, the wife, or the slave. For Aristotle this differentiation in authority is 
required because of the differences in the character of the appropriate subjects: political authority 
governs over citizens, domestic authority administers over the household, and the despot rules 
over its subjects (Politics 1259a37–1259b17; 1260a12–14). Those who blend these types of 
authority rather than differentiate them create a political community that is contrary to human 
flourishing, especially in civic education. 
For the promotion of civic education, Aristotle maintains that good laws are critical because 
of their compulsory nature: they ensure obedience (NE 1180a18–21). The lawgiver therefore 
should “attend to such matters as our nurture and pursuits […] and were to do correctly” (NE 
1180a25–30). However, the problem is that political authority is incapable of making the 
particular distinctions required for good education. Because of the political community’s 
incapacity to address the particular needs and demands of every child in its upbringing, domestic 
authority is desired, since “greater accuracy will result when care is private and directed to the 
particular case, for then each is more likely to receive what is suitable” (NE 1180b11–13). Thus, 
the best education is one which is attentive to individual needs while, at the same time, being 
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directed by someone “who possesses legislative art” (NE 1180b13–25). The political community 
continues to have a role in education for Aristotle, but it must work with domestic authority. 
While the political community should not supplant the household’s role in its education, it is 
also equally important that domestic authority be awaken from its complacency in education. For 
Aristotle, domestic authority is specifically best equipped to “help their own children and friends 
in the pursuit of virtue” (NE 1180a31–34). Domestic authority has a more commanding strength 
than civic laws in children’s obedience, owning to the natural affection that exists in the 
household. Political authority does not have access to the interior principles of motivations that 
domestic authority does: it must rely upon coercion to compel its citizens.7 By contrast, domestic 
authority can inculcate habits that are internally motivated and therefore become part of a child’s 
character. 
Aristotle’s reliance upon domestic authority in the rearing of children highlights the problems 
of Sparta’s civic education.8 Although it is a renowned example of a regime taking interest in 
education, where education “must be common instead of along private lines,” Sparta’s civic 
education ultimately makes its citizens “bestial and coarse” rather than courageous and martial 
(Politics 1337a22–26, 31–32, 1138b11–14, 32–36; NE 1180a24–26). In fact, Sparta’s political 
leaders do not even seek to discover whether their training actually cultivates courage in its 
citizens (Politics 1338b16–17). The result is that Spartan citizens may be acting courageously—
as nobody knows or is willing to discover—out of state coercion rather than being internally 
motivated, i.e., becoming ethically virtuous. Instead of fostering virtue, Sparta’s civic education 
serves as an example of how not to educate citizens. 
Although Sparta’s civic education is in “common,” its defects outweigh its gains due to its 
removal of domestic authority in education. Instead of replacing it, the political community must 
preserve and help the household in education. Specifically, political authority must help elevate 
domestic authority out of its own primordial tribalism like the Cyclopes, each of whom “lives as 
he pleases, laying down the law to his children and wives” (NE 1180a24–29; Politics 1252b22–
23).9 The Cyclopean education is antithetical to Sparta’s: each parent determines for itself how 
best to educate its children, thereby making political community impossible. Between these two 
extremes is Aristotle’s golden mean: the complementary contributions of both political and 
domestic authorities to education.10 The preservation of its plural institutions enables the political 




This reliance upon the golden mean for education also explains Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s 
Republic where Socrates prescribes a political unity that reduces the polis to the household and, 
thus, destroys the political community as such (Politics 1261a21–22).11 Socrates proposes that all 
citizens regard one another as siblings by sharing family life and property communally, which, in 
turn, would reconcile conflicts of interest that destroy political communities (Republic 464a4–
c4). However, for Aristotle, the political community evolves out of many households, with a 
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household outside the political community existing only imperfectly. Only when the household 
is part of the political community is it complete or perfect (telestheises), achieving its proper end 
(Politics 1252b9–39, 1253a18). If one does what Socrates proposes—makes a household out of 
the political community—then the political community would not be a political community per 
se, for “it is evident that virtue must be the care of the polis that is truly, and not merely for the 
sake of the word calling it so” (Politics 1280b6–8, 1253a23–25). Aristotle’s objection to 
Socrates’ proposal is that it disrupts both the political community and the household from 
achieving their proper ends.  
By abolishing the family, Socrates creates a communal, civic education to promote political 
unity. The problem with this type of education for Aristotle is that it is limited in its 
effectiveness. Socrates’ guardians will become spirited (thumos) but eventually will fight among 
themselves: “The manner in which Socrates selects the rulers is hazardous, for the same persons 
always rule. But this is a cause of faction even in the case of those lacking notable qualities, and 
it certainly will be the case among spirited and warlike men” (Politics 1264b6–10). Furthermore, 
and more importantly, the guardians will not become philosophical, which was why they 
required education in the first place (Republic 375e9–376c5, 525b8–9). Thus, the community’s 
existence is precarious, as it depends upon the guardians who are spirited and warlike but 
unphilosophical. 
This failure to develop the guardian’s philosophical capacity is due to Socrates’ reliance on 
the household as the model for civic education and political organization. Because the guardians 
are all siblings to one another, they cannot claim what is most important to them other than the 
polis, thereby preventing them from acting out of public piety. For piety, according to Aristotle, 
requires one to transcend what is most important to a person for the sake of philosophical truth: 
“It would seem to be a better thing, and also part of our duty, to forsake even what is close and 
dear to us (ta oikeia) in order to preserve truth, especially insofar as we are lovers of wisdom 
(philosophous ontas); for although both of them are dear, it is pious to honor the truth first” (NE 
1096a14–17).12 Philosophical truth cannot exist in Socrates’ regime because the guardians are 
unable to challenge what is closest and dearest to them, as everyone and everything belongs to 
one another. 
For Aristotle, citizens who have the greatest capacity for philosophy are made to care for their 
own political community at the expense of their households, just as they are to care for 
philosophical truth at the expense of their own opinions. Thus, Socrates’ regime is similar to 
Sparta’s in that philosophical education is impossible because there is no distinction between the 
political community and the household. Citizens from both regimes are defective in virtue: they 
lack character, as they are not internally motivated except through state coercion, and they are 
unphilosophical, as they are unable to distinguish from what is important to them and what is 
important for truth. But what may be even more disturbing is that these arrangements make 
citizens incapable of critical virtues required by the political community: civic friendship, 
generosity, public piety, and political justice. 
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Civic Friendship, Generosity, and Public Piety 
 
At first glance, Socrates’ communal arrangement seems to promise “wondrous friendship” 
among everyone (Politics 1263b15–18). But, as Aristotle argues, this arrangement actually 
undermines civic friendship (homonoia), a type of concord among citizens (NE 1167b2–3, 
1155a22–28). According to Aristotle, homonoia arises for fellow citizens when “concerning 
what is of common interest they share a like judgment, chose the same things, and act on 
common resolutions” (NE 1167a26–28). But saying the same thing is not indicative of 
homonoia, for citizens may speak not out of personal conviction but out of external pressure (NE 
1261b16–32). 
In Socrates’ regime, this problem becomes particularly manifest. It is impossible to know 
what belongs specifically to each citizen because everyone is part of the same family: “Each of 
the citizens comes to have a thousand sons, though not his personally (hos hekastou)” (Politics 
1261b38–39). The clarity of personal interest is obscured because nobody knows who 
specifically belongs to whom. Citizens are not able to partake in homonoia because they do not 
know their personal interest and therefore cannot overcome it for the common good of the 
political community. It may appear contradictory that attachments to specific personal interests 
are required for the common good; however, these attachments of personal interests oblige 
citizens to weigh their self-interests against the community’s, allowing them the opportunity to 
transcend their parochial concerns for shared ones.  
By contrast, the claim of all saying “mine” rings hollow in Socrates’ regime, for merely 
saying the same thing is not sufficient for homonoia. If all the citizens proclaim that they will 
rule, the result is civil war rather than civic friendship. Homonoia exists when the whole political 
community deliberates about a particular person to be political ruler, if he or she is willing (NE 
1167a30–34). Because citizens are not saying the same thing—the ruled call for a specific ruler, 
and, in turn, the ruler says he or she will rule—civic friendship exists. By saying different but 
concordant things, citizens are able to partake—and be educated—in civic friendship. 
This preservation of disparate interests not only clarifies personal interest but paradoxically 
provides deliberation about the common good.13 This is also why Aristotle divides the property 
of each citizen who resides in the best political community: one part safely in the city and the 
other part perilously near the frontier (Politics 1330a14–20). The citizen has a personal interest 
in both places and consequently for the political community as a whole. Public policy therefore 
can be based on common personal interest rather than factional ones. By dividing citizen’s 
property, Aristotle evaluates the concerns of the household not by transforming them into ones of 
the political community but instead by offering citizens the opportunity to transcend their 
particular perspectives for the common good. 
This preservation of private property also provides the opportunity for citizens to practice the 
virtue of generosity. Contrary to Socrates’ abolishment of private property for the guardians, 
Aristotle’s defense of it enables citizens to partake in civic friendship by being generous. The 
citizen accomplishes this task by having his private property used in common, although Aristotle 
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rejects proposals to have property used in common by either possession or usage, as these ideas 
tend to result in neglect, abuse, and overconsumption (Politics 1262b37–1263a3). Kept legally 
private, property is made common by virtue (Politics 1263a26–27, 1263a37–39). 
Since human beings are naturally political animals and thus belong to the political 
community, they must be willing to overcome their self-love for the common good (Politics 
1253a3–4, 1263a41–b5).14 Although it is natural to love (philia) oneself, it is unnatural to love 
one’s possession as oneself. This person is incapable of partaking in the civic friendship of the 
community (NE 1155a22–28).15 By contrast, the person who is able to practice generosity with 
his private property is able to participate in civic friendship and thereby become a flourishing 
citizen.16 
This also applies to familial love (philia). Another problem with Socrates’ regime is that he 
fundamentally mishandles erotic love (eros). Because nobody knows his/her natural family, 
Socrates’ regime permits incest and other unnatural sexual acts to transpire (Politics 1262a25–
27). These acts have the greatest impropriety for Aristotle. By eradicating the household family, 
Socrates allows eros to pervade the entire political community to the extent that familial love 
cannot arise and develop without contamination of incestuous eros. 
It can be inferred then that eros has no place in familial love for Aristotle except between 
husbands and wives. Unlike Socrates’ regime, Aristotle believes that familial love of children 
and siblings needs to be nurtured and developed in an environment that is protective rather than 
sexualized. This environment is only possible if both the political community and the household 
are preserved. The result is that children remain with their natural parents so that both the 
political community and the household can work together in the care of them (NE 1180a29–b13). 
While parents are able to provide philia to their children without eros, the political ruler can 
provide laws and conventions (nomos) that support and supplement parental rule over children.  
In turn, parental support of these laws adds to children’s piety of political authority (NE 
1180a18–24, 1180b3–7). Since parents have access to the interior principles of motivation of 
children that political authority lack, they are able to provide a more robust education for 
children to respect the political community than what the regime’s law can do.17 Good parents 
are better at inculcating virtuous habits in their children not only because of children’s affection 
for them but also because parents know the particular context and situations of their children and 
respond accordingly, whereas the political community cannot. Thus, both the political 
community and the household mutually reinforce each other in the civic education of children in 
civic friendship and public piety.  
 
Natural and Political Justice 
 
The differentiation between the political community and the household also makes possible a 
civic education in political justice.18 However, the political justice of the community presupposes 
the natural justice of the household. Aristotle makes the distinction between political justice, 
which requires the conditions of freedom, equality, sociability (koinoia), self-sufficiency, and 
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law with other forms of natural justice: household (between husband and wife), paternal 
(between father and son), and despotic (between master and slave) (NE 1134a26–30; Politics 
1134b8–18). Although political justice requires an understanding of freedom and equality, these 
concepts are not learned first in the political community but in the household where natural 
justice is performed (NE 1162a16–18).19 For instance, even though they are not citizens, children 
and wives are free people in the household; and husbands and wives practice a form of 
proportionate equality among themselves (Politics 1259a39–b1, 1260b18–20; NE 1160b25–
61a25; EE 1241b33–41). These types of relationships in the household allow inhabitants to learn 
about freedom and equality as a part of natural justice and, in turn, prepare them to practice 
political justice. 
In fact, Aristotle claims that natural justice would exist even if the political community were 
absent: “a person is characteristically not a solitary but a social animal with those whom he 
shares a natural kinship (physei syggeneia). There would therefore be a sociability and some 
justice (dikaion ti) even if there were no political community” (EE 1242a24–28). It is the 
household where justice and politics originate and becomes a model for political regimes (EE 
1242a24–28, 42b1–2; NE 1160b23–24). Thus, by existing temporally before the political 
community, the household serves as a training ground for citizens in political justice, making the 
type of natural justice of the household correspond to the type of political justice in the regime.20 
Thornton Lockwood provides a schematic of different Aristotelian households corresponding 
to different types of regimes.21 For correct regimes that are governed for the common good, 
paternal rule resembles monarchy, with both the father and the monarch ruling asymmetrically 
for the good of their subjects. The rule of husband and wife is similar to aristocracy as a form of 
proportionate equality and governance based on merit. The camaraderie of siblings is similar to 
timocracy with governance based on the exchange of ruling and being ruled. Likewise, deviant 
households match deviant regimes, those which are governed in the interest of the ruler: the 
household of the master and the slave resembles tyranny; the unequal rule between marital 
partners based on power or wealth corresponds to oligarchy; and the household without a master 
is similar to democracy as a type of anarchy. The type of household determines not only the type 
of natural justice, or its deviant, but also influences the form of political justice, or its deviant, in 
the regime. 
As a form of natural justice, parental governance resembles monarchial justice as both are 
asymmetrical in their relationships between ruler and ruled. Each form of justice corresponds to 
each other but remains distinct in their character and community. Political justice does not 
strictly exist in the household because “there is no injustice in an unqualified sense towards one’s 
own possessions […] and a child, until it reaches a certain age and is separated, is, as it were, a 
part of one’s self” (EN 1134b9–12). But children will eventually become partners (koinonoi) in 
the political community and are to be ruled as free persons; therefore, they need education in the 
household to prepare them for this role (Politics 1260b20–21; 1259a40). Children must learn to 
rule and be ruled in order to become citizens who practice political justice (Politics 1332b36–
33a1). This exchange—ruling and being ruled—transpires first in the household where parents 
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provide children their existence and education, and, later, when children take care of their 
parents in old age and continue the familial line.22 In spite of its asymmetrical character, parental 
governance rules in the best of interest of its children, unlike the tyrannical household where 
parents treat their children no better than slaves (NE 1160b28–32; Politics 1160b25–26; 1252b7–
8). 
The natural justice between husband and wife resembles the political justice found in 
aristocracy where citizens treat one another with proportionate equality and according to merit. 
Although it is clear that Aristotle believes there are fundamental, even biological, differences 
between males and females, it does not necessarily result in the conclusion that husbands and 
wives should be treated unequally.23 The marriage of husband and wife resembles aristocracy in 
that each partner governs over the things that each one should. It is only when a husband tries to 
govern everything, doing things of which he is not capable, or when a wife governs because of 
her wealth and power and not because of her virtue, that the aristocratic resemblance becomes an 
oligarchical one (NE 1160b32–61a4). The Aristotelian marriage is the golden mean between the 
oligarchical partnership where spouses overstep their authorities and the Socratic arrangement 
where all husbands and wives belong to one another. It is the differences between husbands and 
wives that makes possible for natural justice to exist and prepare them for political justice. 
Finally, the natural justice of siblings matches the political justice of timocracies (Politics 
1161a4–7). The relationship between siblings is characterized by a form of equality because of 
similarities in age and education, thereby allowing them to speak frankly with one another and 
ruling and being ruled in turn (NE 1161a6–7, 26–31; 1162a13–14). This characterization also 
resembles the citizens of the polity where their equality forms the basis of them ruling and being 
ruled (1161a28–30). These forms of equality therefore become the basis of both natural and 
political justices among siblings and timocracies. 
Political justice requires the conditions of freedom, equality, sociability, self-sufficiency, and 
law; however, it is unable to provide these prerequisites unless the household exists. It is only the 
household that can socialize citizens into these habits because familial members have access to 
internal principles of motivations that the state lacks. Natural justice therefore does not only 
demand that the household be preserved but it also requires that differences among familial 
members persist for different forms of justice to be practiced. Unlike Socrates’ proposal, which 
abolishes these differences, Aristotle recognizes that the plurality both within the household and 
the political community enables citizens to be best educated in political justice. 
 
Private Friendship, Public Results 
 
The similarities between political and natural justice paradoxically rests upon the fundamental 
distinction between the political community and the household. Political justice consequently 
presupposes and looks past the household in the direction of civic education. Aristotle believes 
that the household offers the advantage of access to internal principles of motivation, such as 
love and respect among familial members; but ultimately the political community is the model of 
Aristotelian Pluralism and Diversity  108 
 
 
civic education because citizens must forgo their personal interests for the common good and 
thereby become virtuous. Those who remain defective in virtue are confused in the 
understanding of their interests, which can negatively overspill into the political community, 
causing social disorder (EE 1248b27; NE 1169a21–2). For Aristotle, these people need to change 
their motivations in understanding both their parochial and political interests.  
According to Aristotle, moderation is the antidote for excessive personal attachment to one’s 
own interests (Politics 1267a10). Moderation is not the restriction or limitation of self-interest 
but the transformation of it so that people no longer see themselves as competitors over scarce 
resources but partners in the same political community. This requires the formation of a 
reasonable person who will not want too much, i.e., to understand that one’s self-interest is not to 
accumulate but to share external goods, for accruing too much would destroy the very conditions 
that enable one’s happiness (Politics 1267b6–8). But how does one change the motivations of a 
person to become reasonable and moderate? How does one get this person to understand what 
goods he or she actually needs to live virtuously (NE 1094b11, 1103b27, 1179b1–4)? 
By moving people from defining themselves as their possessions to an understanding based on 
virtuous relations, Aristotle believes this change will form reasonable and moderate people (NE 
1095a22–23). Most people understand their relations as a form of material equality, thereby 
reducing all relations to a type of business contract of narrowly defined self-interest (NE 1158b3, 
1163a30–35). Aristotle wants to move beyond this understanding to one that gives a motive for 
people to choose the common good because their happiness depends upon it. Rather than having 
possessions define one’s happiness, Aristotle argues that virtuous relations is the appropriate 
criteria for human flourishing. Paradoxically, to engage in virtuous relations forces one to 
recognize one’s dependency on the various communities to which one belongs.24 The person 
must decide whether to fulfill one’s responsibilities and duties to one’s dependencies in the 
household and the political community. If the person is delinquent in these activities, then the 
person not only damages one’s own chance for happiness but also the community on which one 
depends. 
This is why friendship is so critical in Aristotle’s account of ethics and politics.25 Virtuous 
friendship activates a type of awareness (noein) or perception (aisthanesthai) in the person about 
what should be pursued for happiness (NE 1170b1–5, 1170a18).26 With the aid of virtuous 
friends, a person will be able to determine what is truly good: this is the reason why friends are 
the greatest good for a person (NE 1169b10). Friendship does not create a scarcity of resources, 
as with material possessions, but a surplus of virtue that satisfies ethical and intellectual 
demands. It makes people reasonable and moderate in their claims, thereby precluding social 
disorder in the political community (NE 1137b34–1138a2). Friendship consequently is important 
not because what one possesses but because it satisfies what one lacks.27 Aristotle’s quote of 
Heraclitus—“it is opposites that help each other” from which the “sweetest harmonies” arise—
reveals that it is inequality and incommensurability that make virtuous friendship possible (NE 
1155b4–6). It is diversity and not Socratic unity that provides the conditions for human 
flourishing.  
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Private virtuous friendship corresponds to civic friendship. As there is more virtuous 
friendship, there is more civic friendship; as there is more civic friendship, there is more political 
justice in the regime; and as the regime becomes more just, civic friendship, in turn, increases 
(NE 1167b2–5). With this improvement in political justice and civic friendship, it becomes more 
difficult for citizens to be unreasonable and immoderate. However, this directional relationship is 
one-way for Aristotle: civic friendship cannot be transformed into virtuous friendship.28 This is 
what Socrates attempts when he abolishes the family and private property. Virtuous friendship 
must always remain pre-political. 
By remaining private, virtuous friendship paradoxically is able to awaken people to their 
political responsibilities and duties. Reasonable and moderate citizens will understand that their 
self-interest is dependent upon the common good and therefore will act accordingly. The 
political community becomes the model of civic education where citizens sacrifice their personal 
interests for the community’s in order to be virtuous. Thus, Aristotle’s civic education starts in 
private friendship but it ultimately yields public results. By having virtuous friends, people are 
able to recognize what they lack, moving from a self-definition of possessions to a self-
understanding based on virtuous relations. 
 
Education’s Dual Aims 
 
If the household plays a critical role in the cultivation of citizens, so does the political 
community in directing the aims of education. For Aristotle, the education of children is the 
preeminent concern of the political community because they determine the continuity and 
stability of the regime (Politics 1337a10–18).29 However, there exists a tension as to what type 
of education children should receive. Paralleling the tension between the good citizen and the 
good person, Aristotle argues that education should correspond both to a political community’s 
peculiar ends, e.g., a democratic education for democracies, and to virtue itself (Politics 
1276b16–1277b32, 1337a10–21; also 1332a33–34). But it is not immediately clear what 
Aristotle means: for instance, what happens in a democratic regime if a teaching about virtue 
comes into conflict with an instruction about democratic values? How should this situation be 
resolved? 
Aristotle further complicates his view of education by claiming that education should be “one 
and the same for all,” since the political community as a whole possesses a single end; 
consequently, the supervision of education should be conducted by the state (Politics 1337a21–
26). But Aristotle’s insistence that education should be supervised by the political community 
does not equate into abolishment of the household, like in Socrates’ proposal; rather, the 
household cannot dictate what the aims of education should be. It would be an invitation to 
anarchy, as in Athens or among the Cyclopes, if every household could determine for itself the 
ultimate purpose of education of its children. The objective of education and its final supervision 
is determined by the political community but, as argued above, the community needs the 
household to deliver part of that education. Thus, “one and the same for all” is in reference to the 
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ultimate objectives and supervision of education and not the replacement of the household with 
the political community. 
With the differentiation between the political community and the household intact, Aristotle’s 
proposal that education should aim for virtue, while, at the same time, for the peculiar ends of a 
political community can be better understood. While speaking about how political communities 
should educate children for its own peculiar ends, Aristotle concludes that “the best character 
(ethos) is always a cause of a better political community (politeias)” (Politics 1137a16–17). 
Aristotle seems to suggest that political communities, which are not the best ones, are capable to 
evolve into something better if the character of its citizens changes (and corresponding devolves 
into something worst if the citizens’ character becomes corrupt).30 But from where does this 
source to produce the best character come? It cannot come from the political community, as it 
undoubtedly aims to educate children for its own peculiar ends. The best character therefore 
must come from the household, or more broadly, civil society.31 
Civil society potentially can offer a civic education that improves the character of its children, 
who over time will influence the nature and aims of the political community. When Aristotle 
states that education should aim simultaneously for the political community’s peculiar ends and 
virtue, he is reserving a space for better characters to be cultivated in civil society which, in turn, 
will aid the political community. Ultimately it will be left to the prudence of political leaders to 
determine whether these exceptions should be permitted to flourish in civil society.32 In this 
sense, Aristotle selects the golden mean in the aim of education between the extremes of political 
indoctrination and political indifference. By targeting both virtue and the peculiar ends of the 
political community together, Aristotle avoids both stagnation and anarchy in his civic education. 
An example from American history might be useful to illustrate this point. At one time, the 
United States codified racial slavery and segregation, indoctrinating its citizens in support of this 
belief. However, abolitionists and civil rights leaders looked outside the political community’s 
education—civil society—to cultivate a more just character among its citizenry.33 When they 
were able to persuade political leaders and a majority of citizens that all people in the United 
States should be afforded equal treatment and rights, the United States became a better political 
community. Conceding that this transformation took over a century, and even may not yet be 
completed today, it is an example of Aristotle’s point that education should aim for both virtue 
and the peculiar ends of a regime at the same time in the hope that “the best character is always a 
cause of a better political community.” 
 
Plurality and Diversity 
 
The common good of the political community therefore is both its peculiar ends and virtue. This 
is the final aim of civic education for Aristotle. Properly educated citizens consequently have to 
balance, among their personal interests, the political community’s interest, and virtue itself in 
their determination for the common good. The diversity of these goods—personal interest, 
peculiar ends, and virtue—is only possible if pluralistic institutions and a diversity of goods are 
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preserved. Without any one of these elements, a person remains defective both as a citizen and as 
a person. Thus, not only is the common good both unitary and diverse simultaneously but so is 
the person’s own soul. 
The diversity of goods required for the citizen to be virtuous underscores Aristotle’s earlier 
point that virtuous friendship are rooted in what one lacks. Virtuous friends activate an 
awareness in the person about what should truly be pursued for happiness (NE 1170b1–5, 
1170a18). Just as people need friends who are different from them, so does the individual person 
need different goods within one’s soul to be able to see what would be best for oneself and the 
community together. If a person only had one good in its soul, it would be impossible to know 
whether he or she were defective in the possession of any other goods.  
This diversity of goods in the citizen’s soul gives more credence to Aristotle’s insistence that 
all citizens cannot be of similar character, especially with respect to virtue (Politics 1277a1). The 
political community is composed of dissimilar citizens, like the goods in the citizen’s soul, 
because those who rule require a different type of education than those who are ruled (Politics 
1277a29–31). If citizens were of the same character by receiving the same education, they would 
not be able to discern whether they are defective because they have no point of comparison. Nor 
would they be able to transcend their personal interests for the common good, as all citizens 
would share the same self-interest. Unlike Socrates’ regime, Aristotle understands that the 
common good is maintained only if there is a diversity of citizens and a plurality of institutions.  
Aristotle’s preservation of this pluralism, particularly the household, allows access to the 
internal motivations of people which the political community does not have. This is the problem 
with Spartan and Socratic civic education: by abolishing private ownership, the political 
community can only rely on coercion and abstract appeals to motivate its citizens. The result is 
bestial and coarse citizens in the case of Sparta, and civil strife combined with incestuous 
relations in the instance of Socrates. Both regimes have removed conditions that prevent any 
opportunity for people to overcome their personal interest for the common good. Philosophical 
truth, piety, civic friendship, generosity, and familial love without erotic danger are absent in 
these regimes.  
The preservation of the household also makes it possible for its inhabitants to practice natural 
justice as a type of preparation for political justice: parental authority resembles monarchial rule, 
spousal rule corresponds with aristocratic governance, and sibling governance is similar to 
timocratic government. But the motivation to practice political justice at the expense of personal 
interest only comes from virtuous friendship which is a pre-political relationship. In such 
friendships, the person recognizes what one lacks, and thus for what one should strive, realizing 
that one’s ultimate personal interests depends upon the common good of the political 
community. By making the common good the object worthy to be loved, friendship resolves not 
only private disputes but public ones, too (NE 1155a3–17). 
But it is important to remember for Aristotle that the household exist only as a part of the 
political community and its specific virtue exists only as a part of virtue as a whole (Politics 
1260b8–24). Although the household exists prior the political community, the political 
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community must exist conceptually before the household. Education in the household must be 
ultimately supervised by the political community. But this does not necessary translate into 
political indoctrination. Aristotle allows the possibility that a prudent superintendent could 
incorporate lessons from the household to improve the character of the regime, even if those 
teachings were contrary to the peculiar ends of the political community.34 
By preserving the household and providing civic education a dual aim, Aristotle allows the 
common good to be defined diversely with personal interest, political ends, and virtue, all 
seeking equilibrium in both the community and the citizen’s soul. The plurality of institutions 
and the diversity of goods are the necessary and sufficient conditions for civic education to 
flourish. Rather than encouraging discord and anarchy, these conditions promote unity and 
concord among citizens. Without diversity and plurality, a civic education of philosophical truth 
and civic friendship would not be possible. Thus, the path to integrate citizens more fully into the 
political community paradoxically requires one to respect the diversity of goods and the plurality 
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